Politics, Presidents and War Essay

state of struggle is inevitably an exercise in politics. In the best consequence the policy-making movement provides checks and balances that can contain or even restrain contend. In separate cases the political process itself is the primary driving event towards war. These two realities are not mutu accomplice exclusive. The Persian disconnectedness War of 1991 provided evidence of both political realities. Politics influenced the nature and the course of the war, and wrong versa. In the context of what has happened since 1991 the Persian disconnectedness War, also known as Desert screen out and Desert beset, is a fading memory. The political importance of this war cannot be underestimated, however.The socio-political impact of this war would come to actualisation within a decade. This impact is part of a continual process of reflexivity between war and politics, particularly in the United States. For intermit or worse, the presidency itself was altered by this war and the associated political processes. Storm Clouds The Persian disjunction War of 1991 had immediate causes. When ibn Talal Hussein Husseins Iraki phalanx invaded oil-rich capital of Kuwait a crisis was created. The United States and a optical fusion of somely Western nations were compelled to respond. Kuwait was a strategically important ally in the Middle East.If the attack was allowed to stand, ibn Talal Hussein Hussein would be in position to launch an attack against Saudi Arabia, another important ally. aft(prenominal) working several months for a resolution within the United Nations, the coalescency prepared to launch an attack. The agreed upon mission was limited to ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Going any(prenominal) further would require much more discussion. For Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait came on the heels of a failed war with Iran in which millions were killed. War debt was run out(p) Iraqs coffers. There was also a political angle for Iraq. Saddam sense d that he could not appear to be weak in any way.Using revisionist report, Saddam claimed that the Iran war had somehow been a success. That mental object was driven home as Saddam erected even more palaces and monuments commit to himself. The invasion of Kuwait was a calculated political gamble. The United States and other nations had backed him in the war with Iran. He believed, at worst, that those nations would be unsure to his cutover of tiny Kuwait. Meanwhile he peppered the Iraqi media with trumped up charges against Kuwait. regular if he was eventually forced out, Saddam believed that he could plunder the wealth of Kuwait before retreating.With a demoralized army after the Iran war, Saddam also felt he had to keep his army occupied so they could not conspire against him. He tried to put them in a easily winnable situation in an causal agent to solidify his own power. learned how Saddam operated, the United States made certain not to underestimate him. Senator Willia m V. Roth, jr. (R. -Del. ) Said that He is as unpredictable as a empty storm and as deceptive as a mirage (Mitchell, 1991). When Saddam failed to survey with repeated United Nations resolutions, the coalition mobilized itself for war.As in any war, the crisis that caused the quit of the war was simply the culmination of many prior socio-political movements and actions. With that in idea the American system started a concerted political effort to form internal support for the war. The threat was maximized for common consumption. President Bush declared that what is at stake is a New being Order (Abdulla, 1994). Having successfully swayed populace perspicacity, the administration now had to successfully fight the war in both force and political scathe. Politics and Policy In uppercase politics the terms Vietnam War and quagmire are toxic.Any association with them can mean the quick death of a policy or army initiative. In the lead-up to the war politicians capitalize d upon the Vietnam syndrome from a number of angles. Opponents of any array intervention used the phrase potential quagmire numerous times in their arguments. Once it was apparent that a war was going to take place, even supporters used this term in an attempt to shape the instance of war it would be. In other words the political situation require that the coalition go in with overwhelming force, entirely minimize civil casualties at the same time.The administration knew it could not allow an extended guerrilla conflict to emerge. The powerful triangle of war, television and politics had defeated the Johnson administration during Vietnam. This time, the administration was prepared to take extreme measures to prevent such a situation from happening again. Meanwhile, coalition leaders toed a cute political line in maintaining world support for the action. Since before the war had even begun the issue of oil had prompted loud voices of disapproval about the impend war. Opponen ts claimed that the U. S.led coalition was not so concerned with Saddams violation of International Law or with the freedom of a erst sovereign nation. Instead, they claimed that the primary reason for the upcoming attack was to secure discharge for the oil-thirsty Western nations. Oil was a vital strategic concern. Access to shabby oil was a pillar underneath the American economy. Two of the most reliable pre-war suppliers were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In defending these nations, the U. S. hoped not notwithstanding to secure its oil supply but also force a split between the nations in the OPEC oil cartel.In the political arena, though, this by itself was not a thatifiable reason to fight a war. This mentation was particularly true among the European nations in the coalition. Holding this coalition unneurotic was critical to the overall effort. From the office of the administration, the war could not be seen as trading lives for oil. That would reinforce world perceptions of the United States as a greedy empire. Eventually the eroding effect of worldly concern opinion would bring forth weakened the tenuous coalition. In fact, this had been part of Saddams political strategy from the outset.Saddam Hussein apparently counted on American public cheerure to prevent a committment of troops to defend either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia (Carlisle, 2003). Vietnam might be thought of as a constrained war, not in terms of casualties but in terms of the lengths the U. S. was willing to go to ensure victory. The Gulf War, in contrast, was a on the alert war. Every attempt was made to minimize both coalition casualties and the public reporting on those casualties. The military also went out of its way to construe the image that Iraqi civilians were not targets.Reports began to surface about large poem of Iraqi casualties, but they were largely squelched by the constant entry of surgical strikes on the enemy. For his part Saddam tried to play up images of apparentl y innocent Iraqi casualties. American officials admit, in hindsight, that Saddam contend the political game well. after all Saddam is a politician not a soldier (Dunnigan, 1992). The Outcomes Militarily, the Gulf War at starting signal appeared to be as close to flawless as is possible. The Iraqi military was swept out of Kuwait in a matter of weeks.The military had taken reporters into their ranks while still tightly controlling the flow of information. Images of evil accurate smart bomb deployments and successful interception of Iraqi SCUDs by American Patriot missiles permeated the nightly news. President Bushs approval ratings skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Politically the effort was less successful. According to U. S. word & World Report But inasmuch as victory suggests the peremptory defeat of an opponent, there was none. This triumph without victory was perhaps the most big irony of the entire conflict (1993).The U. S. had hoped that Saddam would be overthrown in the process, but was unable to make the case that it should be done by the coalition. When separate of the country revolted against Saddam, the lack of coalition help allowed Saddam to crush them brutally. At the time, the outcome seemed acceptable. According to R. W. Apple, Jr. they appear to have done just enough to make it unlikely that a second Persian Gulf war will erupt any time soon (1991). In hindsight it is apparent that this set the stage for another Gulf War. Ten long time later, the U. S.and a smaller coalition of nations launched an attack with the expressed purpose of overthrowing Saddam. The Presidency The Gulf War of 1991 was a watershed moment in the history of the Presidency of the United States. The War Powers Act theoretically reserved the rightfulness to make war to the U. S. Congress. An increasingly long line of Presidents have resisted this notion, finding loopholes in order to defend American interests. The Gulf War was uncomparable in that the Presid ent undertook a sustained effort to marshal internationalisticist support before even gaining domestic support.Critics charge that Bush was toilsome to circumvent Congress by seeking United Nations approval (U. S. discussion & World Report, 1993). There was dissent in the Congress to the asseverate of political power by the President. Many felt that the issue was not thoroughly debated. George Mitchell (D. -ME) wrote that In effect the President, overnight, with no consultation and no public debate, changed American policy from being part of a collective effort to enforce diplomatic sanctions into a predominantly American effort, relying upon the use of American military force. (Mitchell, 1991)Nevertheless, this would gravel the template for future Presidents wishing to undertake military action. A formal declaration of war, as they saw it, was unnecessary. As the Commander-in drumhead the President is charged with defending American interests. A further maintain of Presi dential power was the perceived shackling of the press (U. S. intelligence activity & World Report, 1993). For the first time, a full-scale effort to control the modern, multimedia press was undertaken. The in the National interest argument was used to full effect. From this perspective the administration could paint uncooperative media as unpatriotic or untrustworthy. destruction In Vietnam, television had shown Americans the realities of modern warfare. Political ramifications soon followed. In the Gulf War of 1991, the conflict was, in fact, planned from a political and media perspective. The war pronounced an increase in the assertion of Presidential power. It also marked an increase in the ability of that branch to use the media, public opinion and internationalism to increase that power. It was a political evolution that has now become commonplace. Was the Persian Gulf War of 1991 a success? Militarily, it was. The military carried out its proscribed mission with remarkabl e efficiency and media savvy.In terms of international politics, it merely preserved the status quo while not resolving any underlying problems. In terms of domestic politics it allowed for an increase in Presidential power while setting the template for future military conflicts in successive administrations. The template worked efficiently for a while, but by the end of the second Bushs administration the political pendulum was baseball swing back toward Congress and more hesitancy in carrying out big military actions. Works Cited Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. Gulf War the socio-political background. Arab Studies Quarterly. 16. 3 (1994). Apple, R. W. Jr. After the War Politics Another Gulf War? The New York Times. 10 Mar. 1991 B01. Carlisle, Rodney P. Persian Gulf War. New York Facts on File, 2003. Dunnigan, James E. & Bay, Austin. From Shield to Storm. New York Morrow & Co. , 1992. Mitchell, George. Confrontation in the Gulf War and quiescence A sampling from the debate on Capi tol Hill. The New York Times. 11 Jan. 1991 A03. U. S. News and World Report. Triumph Without Victory the unreported history of the Persian Gulf War. New York Random House, 1993.